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ESSAY
THE AGE OF SCALIA
Jamal Greene*
During periods of apparent social dissolution the traditionalists, the true
believers, the defenders of the status quo, turn to the past with an interest
quite as obsessive as that of the radicals, the reformers, and the revolutionaries. What the true believers look for, and find, is proof that, once
upon a time, things were as we should like them to be: the laws of economics worked; the streams of legal doctrine ran sweet and pure; order,
tranquility, and harmony governed our society. Their message is: turn
back and all will be well.1
INTRODUCTION
How does an originalist and a textualist, dropped in the middle of a
Kulturkampf,2 branded a sophist and a bigot by his detractors,3 grow
up to have the nation's first African American President call him "one
of the towering legal figures of our time"? 4 It is tempting to say that
Justice Antonin Scalia's jurisprudential clarity and crisp writing calcified his high place in the history of American law, that he managed to
make an existentially regressive theory of constitutional interpretation - originalism - broadly appealing.5 Then-Senator Joseph Biden
once suggested that his vote to confirm Justice Scalia to the Supreme
Court was the one he most regretted of all his time in the Senate, for

* Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank Jessica BulmanPozen, Jeremy Kessler, David Pozen, Reva Siegel, and the staff of the Harvard Law Review for
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts.
1 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 92 (2d ed. 2014) (citation omitted).
2 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3 See, e.g., Rachel Anspach, Scalia Was Not a Hero. He Was a Bigot, HUFFINGTON POST:
THE BLOG (Feb. 17, 2016, I0:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rachel-anspach/scalia
-was-not-a-hero-he-_b_9245850.html [https://perma.cc/5DK7-gWGX]; Martin Dyckman, Eroding
Our Trust in the High Court, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Apr. 4, 2004), http://www.sptimes.com
/2004/04/04/Columns/Eroding-ourtrust-in_.shtml [https://perma.cc/3N9Z-WNZJ] (referring to
Justice Scalia's "brilliant sophistry").
4 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by the President on the Passing of the U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press

-office/20I6/02/I 3/remarks-president-passing-us-supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia [https://
perma.cc/B75 4 -J5WB].
Quite tempting indeed. See Jamal Greene, Liberal Love for Antonin Scalia, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 14, 20I6), http://www.nytimes.com/2oi6/O2/I5/opinion/what-liberals-learned-from-antonin

-scalia.html [https://perma.cc/gXBP-8YBK] ("[Justice Scalia] made constitutional theory sexy.").
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the simple reason that "he was so effective."6 It is far from obvious,
though, that Justice Scalia's interventions in constitutional law will
endure past his death. Indeed, it is not clear they succeeded even in
Justice Scalia's own time. For all the talk of his titanic influence,' did
Justice Scalia throw away his shot?
Here, in a nutshell, is the puzzle. The day Justice Scalia died,
Dean William Treanor of the Georgetown University Law Center issued a statement in which he called Justice Scalia "a giant in the history of the law, a brilliant jurist whose opinions and scholarship profoundly transformed the law."8 A Georgetown law professor, Gary
Peller, responded with indignation, writing an open letter to the
Georgetown Law community that read, in part:

&

6 Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, ro3d Cong. 279 (1993) (statement
of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Dies at 79, WASH. POST
(Feb. 13, 2016) (quoting then-Dean Elena Kagan's statement that Justice Scalia "is the justice who
has had the most important impact over the years on how we think and talk about law"),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-79/20i6/02
[https://perma.cc/5N5X-FUE4]; Benjamin
/13/effe8I84-a62f-Ile3-a5fa-55foc77bf39c-story.html
Morris, How Scalia Became the Most Influential Conservative Jurist Since the New Deal,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 14, 2016, 3:09 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-scalia
-became-the-most-influential-conservative-jurist-since-the-new-deal [https://perma.cc/NFW 7 -QLF
K]; Georgetown Law Mourns the Loss of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, GEO. L.
(Feb. 13, 20I6) [hereinafter Georgetown Statement], https://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/webstories/georgetown-law-mourns-the-loss-supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia.cfm [https://perma.c
c/LXU 7 -QR6E] (quoting Dean William Treanor's statement that "[i]n the history of the Court,
few Justices have had such influence on the way in which the law is understood"). Justice Scalia's
long-term impact on statutory interpretation, through his "new textualist" focus on statutory text
rather than legislative history, will likely be greater than his impact on constitutional law. See
Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes at 7:59 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses
-statutory-interpretation [https://perma.cc/7RYG-M8K 7 ] (suggesting that "the primary reason"
Justice Scalia will "go down as one of the most important, most historic figures in the Court" is
that he "taught everybody how to do statutory interpretation differently"). Encomiums that celebrate Justice Scalia's jurisprudential legacy are not always precise in separating his various
strands of influence. That said, Justice Scalia's impact on textualism, which is beyond the scope
of this Comment, also requires a more sober assessment than is typical. See Jeremy K. Kessler
David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life-Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 26), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id
=2755578 [https://perma.cc/MHL5-RE87] (arguing that new textualism has "worked itself impure," such that the theory is no longer capable of serving the purpose of judicial restraint). The
point stands, moreover, that Justice Scalia's attempt to extend his textualism into constitutional
originalism fairly demonstrates the limits of the approach, which simply lacks the resources to
overcome intense political and social conflict. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (applying a contextually sensitive form of textualism to interpret the Affordable Care Act to permit subsidies to people who obtain health insurance through federally operated exchanges).
8 Georgetown Statement, supra note 7. Justice Scalia is an alumnus of Georgetown University, though he did not attend its law school.
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I imagine many other faculty, students and staff, particularly people of
color, women and sexual minorities, cringed . . at the unmitigated praise
with which the press release described a jurist that many of us believe was
a defender of privilege, oppression and bigotry, one whose intellectual positions were not brilliant but simplistic and formalistic. . . . [E]ven a Supreme Court Justice can be a bigot, and there is no reason to be intimidated by the purported "brilliance" that others describe .... 9

Objecting, two of Peller's colleagues, Professors Randy Barnett and
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, responded to the open letter with one of
their own. 10 Among other things, they offered an analogy:
What would be the reaction if either of us had sent a similarly-worded
email to the entire student body . . . upon the death of Justice Thurgood
Marshall - saying that he was a bigot, and his "intellectual positions were
not brilliant but simplistic"? Is there any doubt that the Georgetown reaction would justly be swift, dramatic, and severe? 1

Two aspects of this exchange concern us here. First, Dean Treanor
repeated the frequent claim that Justice Scalia "profoundly transformed the law." Second, Peller in effect called Justice Scalia a bigot,
and the response to his letter viewed it as parallel to saying the same
about Justice Marshall.
This Comment takes each of these claims seriously and shows how
they relate to one another. The positive claim that Justice Scalia dramatically changed American law must be defended. Within the limited but significant domain of constitutional law, the Comment concludes that the claim is overstated. As Part I discusses, Justice Scalia
joined the Court seeking to make it both more originalist and more
devoted to articulating general rules rather than reliant on balancing
tests. This dual set of commitments works together to rhetorically
support a program of legal stasis. Justice Scalia spoke for the value of
predictability in constitutional law, an end that he argued could be furthered by adhering to the original commitments of the founding generation and by articulating constitutional doctrine in terms of general
rules rather than open-ended standards or balancing tests that required judges to make qualitative judgments about the law's
requirements.
Part II shows that the Court Justice Scalia left seems to be neither
more originalist nor more rule oriented than the one he joined. This

9 David Lat, Controversy Erupts at a Ti4 Law School over How (or Even Whether) to Mourn
Justice Scalia, ABOVE L. (Feb. 17, 2016, 6:21 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2oi6/O2/controversy-e
rupts-at-a-tI4-law-school-over-how-or-even-whether-to-mourn-justice-scalia/2 [https://perma.cc
/9H 3A-GR 4 5].
10 See David Lat, 'Scaliagate'at Georgetown Law: The Conservatives Strike Back, ABOVE L.
(Feb. 18, 2016, 11:29 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/20i6/02/scaliagate-at-georgetown-law-the
-conservatives-strike-back/2 [https://perma.cc/CB25-ULW6].
11 Id.
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result is itself predictable. At full strength, the Court has nine Justices
who hold a range of substantive and methodological commitments; the
stakes are too high to expect the Court to coalesce around originalism,
or indeed around any single interpretive approach. Even if each of the
Justices were an originalist acting in good faith, we would expect a
healthy dose of stare decisis and internal division about what
originalism requires to undermine its ability to predict the answers to
hard cases. As to constitutional rules, their life at the Supreme Court
has tended to be nasty, brutish, and short. The complexity of a modern cosmopolitan political order invariably presses for exceptions and
qualifications to even the most well-meaning rules.
Part III seeks to explain the perception of Justice Scalia as legally
transformative. This perception is genuine and widely recognized,
even (and indeed, especially) within constitutional law. Justice Scalia
did not profoundly affect constitutional doctrine, but he played a vital
role in articulating a formalistic view of law within an era of dramatic
social transformation. Professor Grant Gilmore argued in his wellknown book, The Ages of American Law, that formalism tends to come
in waves, as an almost-predictable response to external events that unsettle the law. 1 2 Eighteenth-century England had its William Blackstone, who "claimed incessantly that the fixed or settled character of
the substantive law restricted judicial discretion"1 3 at a time when the
common law was filled with contradiction and in drastic need of reform. 1 4 The Gilded Age had its Christopher Columbus Langdell, who
in view of the flowering of law all about him invented a method of
study that treated "the vast majority" of cases as "useless and worse
than useless." 1 5 The present generation had Justice Scalia, who defended the dead Constitution with a vigor that only a verdant one
could have produced.
Constitutional politics in the age of pluralism1 6 involves more than
just claims for remediation of obvious injustices such as chattel slavery
12 GILMORE, supra note 1.
13 John H. Langbein, Blackstone on Judging, in BLACKSTONE AND HIS COMMENTARIES:
BIOGRAPHY, LAW, HISTORY 65, 65 (Wilfrid Prest ed., 2009).
14 See JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 4 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart

eds., 1988) (1776) ("It is on this account that I conceived, some time since, the design of pointing
out some of what appeared to me the capital blemishes of [Blackstone's] work, particularly this
grand and fundamental one, the antipathy to reformation; or rather, indeed, of laying open and
exposing the universal inaccuracy and confusion which seemed to my apprehension to pervade
the whole."); cf Richard A. Posner, Blackstone and Bentham, 19 J.L. & ECON. 569, 569-71 (1976)
(criticizing Bentham's takedown of Blackstone but conceding "Blackstone's complacency about
the manifestly imperfect English legal system," id. at 570-71).
15 CC. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vi (Boston,

Little, Brown & Co. 1871).
16 See generally ANDREI MARMOR, LAW IN THE AGE OF PLURALISM (2007); PHILOSOPHY

IN AN AGE OF PLURALISM (James Tully with Daniel M. Weinstock eds., 1994).
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and Jim Crow. Its defining claims are for distribution of society's
goods to communities that sit outside the existing normative universe
of adjudicative law 7 : religious minorities seeking exemptions from
generally applicable laws;1" women challenging gender norms in university admissions and in reproductive medicine 1 9 African American
students challenging traditional measures of academic excellence; 2 0
gays and lesbians challenging existing public morality and
heteronormative social institutions; 21 economic libertarians challenging
the indignities of the regulatory state under a post-Carolene Products
deference regime. 2 2 In this environment, the status quo is itself a constituency seeking to make claims on constitutional law, to strive (quixotically) to preserve it as consistent, predictable, and settled. 2 3
Justice Scalia was that constituency's Thurgood Marshall. His critique of a Constitution that had the capacity to embrace the unfamiliar
and the unanticipated was stunningly articulate. It is unsurprising
that his defenders view him as a powerful exemplar of neutrality and
reason and his detractors view him as a bigot. Justice Scalia's symbolic purpose was to speak for the law's intolerance of social change, for
its limited imagination, for its jurispathic 24 instincts. His mission as
an advocate (le mot juste) was to make constitutional law great again.
Whether or not Justice Scalia was a bigot, his client - the law of
chronic resistance to novelty - most certainly was.
I. JUSTICE SCALIA'S AGENDA

Three decades ago, in the summer of 1986, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., a
junior professor at the Harvard Law School, was hard at work on a
substantial manuscript on U.S. constitutional interpretation. 2 5 Unlike

See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
L. REV. 4, 4 (1983).
18 See, e.g., Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
20 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539
U.S. 306 (2003).
21 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558
17

97

HARV.

(2003).
22 See

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); see also Williamson v. Lee
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
23 See William N. Eskridge, Jr, Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, I00 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2069 (2002) ("[A]ny substantial
success [by an identity-based social movement] will generate a countermovement seeking to preserve old forms or new enclaves of segregation (normative recognition that the minority's trait is
malign or, at best, tolerable).").
24 See Cover, supra note 17, at
40.
25 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
Ioo HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987).
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most scholarship within this genre, 2 6 Fallon's article was largely descriptive. Rather than defend a particular interpretive method, Fallon
developed a typology of argument styles that were, by consensus, relevant within constitutional law. 27 Fallon's opening paragraph offered a
lay of the land:
With only a few dissenters, most judges, lawyers, and commentators recognize the relevance of at least five kinds of constitutional argument: arguments from the plain, necessary, or historical meaning of the constitutional text; arguments about the intent of the framers; arguments of
constitutional theory that reason from the hypothesized purposes that best
explain either particular constitutional provisions or the constitutional text
as a whole; arguments based on judicial precedent; and value arguments
that assert claims about justice or social policy. 2 8
For Fallon, constitutional law was fundamentally pluralistic. No
one approach could be said to dominate all others. To the contrary,
Fallon's overarching thesis held that constitutional actors are drawn to
view the different approaches as being in harmony rather than in
competition with each other. 29
That summer, another young law professor, Michigan's T. Alexander Aleinikoff, was toiling over his own magnum opus. 30 Aleinikoff's
focus was a set of constitutional decisional tools orthogonal to but no
less important than Fallon's forms of argument: the use of a balancing
versus a categorical approach in adjudicating conflicts between the interests of the state and the asserted constitutional rights of individuals.3 1 Aleinikoff sought to expose and to problematize the ubiquity of
balancing, which he described in his opening paragraph as "a form of
constitutional reasoning . . . that has become widespread, if not dominant, over the last four decades." 32
Gilmore has written that "academic literature, viewed historically,
brings us as close as we are apt to come to what Justice Holmes once
referred to as 'the felt necessities of the time."'"3 As to constitutional
law in the summer of 1986, he was clearly right.
Fallon's and
Aleinikoff's articles, which were published the same month in the nation's two leading law reviews, identify two then-dominant features of

26 A notable exception is the work of Professor Philip Bobbitt.

See PHILIP BOBBITT,

CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-IIg (1982).

27
28
29
30

See Fallon, supra note 25, at ff94.
Id. at II89-go (footnote omitted).
See id. at ff93.
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943

(1987).

31 See id. at 949.
32 Id. at 943-44.

33

GILMORE, supra note

1, at 16 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON

LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963) (188)).
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U.S. constitutional interpretation: interpretive pluralism and balancing. They also describe the two leading sources of agita for Justice
Scalia. Justice Scalia was nominated and confirmed to the Supreme
Court over the course of that eventful summer of 1986, and his first
two major scholarly lectures as a Supreme Court Justice announced
the agenda that would come to define his jurisprudence.
First, in September 1988, Justice Scalia delivered the William
Howard Taft Lecture on Constitutional Law at the University of Cincinnati College of Law. 3 4 That talk, entitled Originalism:The Lesser
Evil, amounted to Justice Scalia's most extended public defense to that
point of originalism, the view that the Constitution should be interpreted as it was understood by the members of the founding generation. Consistent with Fallon's positive description of constitutional argument, Justice Scalia lamented that "nonoriginalist exegesis has, so to
speak, come out of the closet,"3 5 and that, unlike in the past, "many
prominent and respected commentators reject the original meaning of
the Constitution as an authoritative guide." 3 6
For Justice Scalia, originalism was not a flawless approach but it
was better than its alternatives. Nonoriginalism, he argued, divorced
the justification for judicial review - the status of the Constitution as
law 37 - from its exercise, which involved what for Justice Scalia were
distinctly nonlegal forms of discretion. It was, moreover, the very lack
of consensus as to the best alternative to originalism that counted in
originalism's favor. "If the law is to make any attempt at consistency
and predictability," Justice Scalia said, "surely there must be general
agreement not only that judges reject one exegetical approach
(originalism), but that they adopt another. And it is hard to discern
any emerging consensus . . . . "3 Originalism had only to outrun its
friends, not the bear itself.
Justice Scalia must have understood the sleight of hand this argument was performing. It is true, of course, that consistency and predictability are important values for the law to promote, particularly for
an apex court charged with setting the terms of the law for lower
courts, public officials, and citizens. It is also true that, all else equal,
and training solely on the dimensions of consistency and predictability,
we should expect a regime fully committed to originalism to outperform a regime with no particular jurisprudential commitments at all.
Originalism requires the exercise of often difficult judgments about the
state of the historical record, about how to choose among competing
34 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
35 Id. at 852.
36 Id. at 853.
37 See id. at 854 (discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
38 Id. at 855.
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historical materials, and about whether to focus on the intentions and
understandings articulated by "framers" as against those of a disinterested "reasonable person" reading the Constitution's words, 3'9 and Justice Scalia was under no illusion that originalism obviates the exercise
of judgment. 40 Still, these judgments are fewer than those required
when one approaches interpretation with no anchor at all and, importantly, originalism provides a stronger basis for external criticism
than its alternatives. Hard to say a man is lost unless you know where
he's going.
There are several problems with this justification for originalism,
two of which are worth highlighting before we proceed. First, if
originalism leads to greater consistency and predictability in the law, it
is because originalism is transparent. In order for originalism to be
transparent, its metes and bounds must be specified in some detail
and, crucially, it must be deployed without compromise. At the time
of his Taft Lecture, Justice Scalia was famously unwilling to accede to
this condition. In fact, he wrote that "almost every originalist would
adulterate it with the doctrine of stare decisis"4 1 and that he himself
"may prove a faint-hearted originalist" because he could not imagine
upholding a flogging law. 4 2 The concession that originalism might at
times succumb to stare decisis or to conventional morality tints the
methodology's windows. 4 3
Part of the sleight of hand is that it is in fact easy to discern a consensus as to the alternative to originalism. As Fallon's article and Professor Philip Bobbitt's work4 4 indicate, the alternative is pluralism.
Pluralism includes occasional use of historical argument. Indeed, as
Fallon argues, in the usual case the interpreter understands historical
argument as being consistent with other interpretive strategies. To say
that historical argument should be used sometimes is therefore to say
nothing interesting. Originalism's bite comes from its use in hard cases, those where it conflicts with arguments based on precedent or consequences. A compromising originalism begs the question.
Second, and more to the point, consistency and predictability are
not the only values that are important to a well-functioning legal sys39

See

RANDY

E.

BARNETT,

RESTORING

THE

LOST

CONSTITUTION:

THE

PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 92 (2004).

40 See Scalia, supra note 34, at 85 6-57.
41
42

Id. at86I.
Id. at 864.

43 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 298-99
(2007). Justice Scalia might well have changed his position on faintheartedness in recognition of
this problem. See Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013),
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-IO [https://perma.cc/3R5K-HTE6] ("I described myself as [fainthearted] a long time ago. I repudiate that.").
44 BOBBITT, supra note 26.
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tem. The law must also promote justice, if not as an autonomous
moral value then certainly by the lights of the law itself and its underlying purposes. An appellate judge need not simply ensure that legal
adjudication is consistent and predictable - many decisional procedures could do so far better than originalism 45 - but must also ensure
that it is correct according to law. The law's language might reflect a
desire to account for evolving moral sentiment, as in the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 46 The
law's immanent structure might suggest a special concern for the endurance of the system, as Chief Justice Marshall said of the U.S. Constitution in McCulloch v. Maryland.4 7 The Constitution, he famously
wrote, is "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs." 48
To be sure, consistency and predictability can enable that adaptation. Citizens and public officials must know what the ground rules
are in order to raise families, enter into enduring agreements, and
make and enforce laws. But just as surely, an inflexible approach to
legal adjudication that precludes novel claim making or renders the
law unresponsive to organic change can undermine the stability of the
legal system. 4 9 Like skyscrapers and bridges, the law must at times
sway with the wind if it is to withstand its pressures. To say, then,
that the law's need to be consistent and predictable requires an
originalist approach that relieves the adjudicator of her discretion reasons in a circle. It rests on a value choice - a preference for inflexibility - that is external to law.
Justice Scalia soon made this preference even clearer. Five months
after his Taft Lecture, Justice Scalia delivered the Holmes Lecture at
the Harvard Law School. Entitled The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, the talk explained that in the realm of appellate adjudication,
decisionmaking should proceed according to general rules of law rather than according to case-by-case application of legal standards, which
Justice Scalia termed "the discretion-conferring approach."5 0 Although
judicial discretion may be necessary to achieve "perfect justice" - a
caricatured acknowledgment of the point made above about
originalism - this approach fails to convey the appearance of jus45 Think "the Government always wins." Cf United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270, 30O (Ig66) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation
under § 7 [of the Clayton Act], the Government always wins.").
46 U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
47 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
48 Id. at 4 15.
49 See id.; see also ZACHARY ELKINS, Tom GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE
ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 81-83 (2009) (arguing that flexibility is necessary to constitutional endurance).
5o Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177
(1989).
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tice. 1 According to Justice Scalia, adjudication by general rules confers the additional benefits of enabling self-restraint and, crucially, of
fostering predictability in the law. 5 2
For Justice Scalia, decisionmaking according to general rules was
the horse and originalism the cart. Originalism was the surest way of
implementing a foundational commitment to rule-based jurisprudence.
As he explained in his Holmes Lecture, originalism "facilitates the
formulation of general rules" because "[t]he raw material for the general rule is readily apparent."5 3 The practices of the founding-era society more easily form the basis for a general rule than does an evolving
consensus.5 4 This observation approaches tautology, for a rule as Justice Scalia understands it derives its value from its inflexibility. A legal directive whose content shifts in response to new assessments of its
underlying values is better understood as a standard rather than as a
rule.5 5 Justice Scalia accordingly concluded his lecture by imploring
appellate courts, where possible, to avoid "totality of the circumstances
tests and balancing modes of analysis." 5 6
II. JUSTICE SCALIA'S QUALIFIED FAILURE
Justice Scalia set himself a difficult task. Originalism has never
been the exclusive or even the dominant approach to Supreme Court
opinion writing except at a level of generality that failed to serve Justice Scalia's core values of consistency and predictability. Constitutional fidelity presupposes some attention to the document's original
design, but attention to the Constitution's purposes can give quite
wide berth to constitutional construction.5 And Justice Scalia's brand
of rule-bound adjudication is reminiscent of a kind of formalism that
has not accurately described even the rhetoric of American law in at
least a century.58
Justice Scalia's passing provides an apt occasion to assess whether
he succeeded at making the Supreme Court either more originalist or
51 Id.
52 See id. at ii7g-80.
3 Id. at 1184.
54 See id.
See

HENRY

M.

HART, JR.

& ALBERT

M.

SACKS,

THE

LEGAL PROCESS:

BASIC

Jr.

&

5

PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 139-41 (William N. Eskridge,

Philip P Frickey eds., 1994).
56 Scalia, supra note 50, at 1187.
7 See generally Balkin, supra note 43 (arguing that an original meaning approach supports a
constitutional right to abortion).
58 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS II2 (1920)

("My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more: logic, and history, and
custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right conduct, are the forces which singly or in
combination shape the progress of the law.").
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more rule oriented. In short, he did not. As an institution, the Supreme Court has rejected a constitutional jurisprudence grounded in
either originalism or rules.
A. Originalism
In measuring whether the Court is more originalist now than when
Justice Scalia joined it, it is important to settle on a working definition
of originalism. Although it is easy to describe the family of theories
that go by the name, some of those theories distinguish between interpretation and adjudication and others amount to "just so" descriptions
of constitutional fidelity For example, a number of scholars have offered recently that the positive practice of American constitutional law
is best described as originalist. Professor William Baude has written
that we might understand originalism to accommodate practices, such
as stare decisis, that are consistent with Founding-era theories of legal
interpretation5 9 Likewise, Professor Stephen Sachs has suggested that
modern Americans might be faithful to originalism understood as a
theory of legal change; prevailing practices of U.S. constitutional argument seem to presuppose that the law does not change except
through modes consistent with the expectations of the relevant founding generation. 60 Thus, a leading justification of Brown v. Board of
Education renders it an unproblematic modern application of the
Equal Protection Clause rather than a change in the Constitution,
which would have required an Article V amendment. 61 These relatively sanguine accounts preserve originalism's place within the American constitutional tradition by understanding it in broad, essentially
pluralist, terms.
These are not the terms by which we should measure Justice Scalia's jurisprudential legacy. Conceiving of stare decisis or evolving understandings of constitutional provisions as embraced within
originalism may be true to some philosophical conception of the theory,
but it does not capture the foils that animated Justice Scalia. An accounting of Justice Scalia's legacy must track his own beliefs and practices. This tracking turns out to be difficult. Justice Scalia was an
early proponent of what has come to be known as original meaning
originalism, a form of textualism that identifies the Constitution with
the meaning of its words to a reasonable person at the time of enact-

59 See William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2356-61
(2015).

60 See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 817, 820-21 (2015).
61 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. I (1955); see also Sachs, supra note 6o, at 854 (explaining the Court's rejection of
history in Brown as "describ[ing] current facts about education as inputs to a rule about equality").
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ment. In fact, many scholars trace the advent of the original meaning
approach to a speech Justice Scalia gave to the Attorney General's
Conference on Economic Liberties three days before President Reagan
announced his nomination to the Court. 62 Later, in the Tanner Lectures that became his celebrated book, A Matter of Interpretation,Justice Scalia said, "[w]hat I look for in the Constitution is precisely what
I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the
original draftsmen intended."6 3 So far so good.
It is easy to identify the brand of originalism Justice Scalia
preached, but it is more difficult to articulate the brand that he practiced. The "meaning" of a text is not the same as its customary applications. 6 4 There are many different ways of describing this dichotomy:
original meaning versus original expected application,'6 5 sense versus
reference, 6 6 connotation versus denotation,' semantic versus expectation originalism. 68 Justice Scalia accepted this distinction6 9 but did not
appear to accept its implications. 0 Thus, for Justice Scalia, the fact
that the Founding generation evidently understood the death penalty
as not constituting cruel and unusual punishment meant that it could
not be understood as cruel and unusual today. 1 The fact that Ameri62 Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General's Conference on Economic Liberties
in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK app. C (1987); see Bernard

Weinraub, Burger Retiring, Rehnquist Named Chief; Scalia, Appeals Judge, Chosen for Court,
N.Y. TIMES, June I8, 1986, at Ai.
63 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpretingthe Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
64 But see

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,

PHILOSOPHICAL

INVESTIGATIONS

§

43

(EM.S.

Hacker & Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M. Anscombe et al. trans., Wiley-Blackwell rev. 4 th ed. 2009)
(1953) ("[Tlhe meaning of a word is its use in the language.").
65 See Balkin, supra note 43, at 292-93.
66 See Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUis
U. L.J. 555 (2006).
67 See King v Jones (1972) 128 CLR 221, 229 (Austl.). See generally I JOHN STUART MILL, A
SYSTEM OF LOGIC: RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE 31-42 (London, Longmans, Green,
Reader & Dyer 9 th ed. 1875) (1843) (explaining the distinction between connotation and
denotation).
68 See Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 63, at
115, 119-20.
69 See Antonin Scalia,

Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 63, at

129,

14470 See Balkin, supra note 43, at 295-97.

Justice Scalia also implicitly relied upon the inten-

tions of the Framers even while disclaiming this approach. For example, in his majority opinion
in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), he chided Justice Stevens for relying, in dissent, on Antifederalist views of the meaning of the Second Amendment, id. at 590 n.12. It is not
clear why an original meaning originalist would discount the beliefs of opponents of the Constitution, who were just as legally knowledgeable and fluent as the Constitution's proponents. See
Jamal Greene, The Case for OriginalIntent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1692-94 (2012).
71 See Scalia, supra note 69, at 145.
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cans in the 1860s did not think the Equal Protection Clause applied to
sex discrimination or sexual orientation meant it was inappropriate for
Americans to apply it that way today.7 2 A government practice that
did not constitute a search in 1791 did not constitute a search today.73
Constitutional lawyers do not customarily reason in this way, and
neither does the Court. To be sure, and consistent with its pluralism,
the Court adopts originalist methods in some cases. Indeed, as I have
argued elsewhere, it does so fairly systematically in cases involving
constitutional provisions that the Justices understand as rules
norms that are clearly designed to narrow the range of discretion enjoyed by future decisionmakers. 7 4 Think of The Pocket Veto Case,75
involving the meaning of the word "Adjournment" in Article J,76 or
NLRB v. Noel Canning77 involving interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause.78 But originalism in cases involving narrow constitutional rules is not new, and was practiced even by the Warren
Court,7 9 which is thought to be an especially nonoriginalist Court. 0
Originalism on Justice Scalia's terms can declare victory only if the
Court uses historical methods in cases involving the more open-ended
provisions that form Justice Scalia's paradigm cases: the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and so
72 See Antonin Scalia, CAL. LAW. (Jan. 2011), http://www.callawyer.com/2oIi/oi/antonin
-scalia [https://perma.cc/94BF-X6SW]. Many observers have questioned how Justice Scalia reconciled his views about the Equal Protection Clause with the Court's decision in Brown v. Board
of Education, in light of the Reconstruction-era tolerance of racially segregated public schools.
See Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, NEW
YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 40, 54 ("Scalia is asked about [Brown] so often in his public appearances that he will say things like 'Waving the bloody shirt of Brown again, eh?"'). Justice Scalia
defended the result in Brown as consistent with originalist analysis, see, e.g., Rutan v. Republican
Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 n.i (iggo) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment's
requirement of 'equal protection of the laws,' combined with the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of the institution of black slavery, leaves no room for doubt that laws treating people differently because of their race are invalid."), but his disregard of original expected application in this
domain is not consistent with his treatment of other forms of discrimination, see Scalia, supra ("In
1868, when the 3 9th Congress was debating and ultimately proposing the 1 4 th Amendment, I
don't think anybody would have thought that equal protection applied to sex discrimination, or
certainly not to sexual orientation. So does that mean that we've gone off in error by applying the
1 4 th Amendment to both? Yes, yes.").
73 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
74 See Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
279 U.S. 655 (1929).

76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.

9 See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521-47 (1969) (using historical analysis to determine the power of the House of Representatives under Article i section 5 to expel a member
for corruption); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8-18 (1964) (deriving a principle of one person,
one vote from a historical inquiry into Article i section 2 of the Constitution).
so Sachs, supra note 6o, at 885 ("The first modern originalists ... wanted to constrain judges,
in reaction to what they saw as a wild-and-crazy Warren Court.").
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forth. Originalism in these areas would indeed mark a departure from
practices prevalent in 1986.
By this measure, originalism has lost, and soundly This past Term
is emblematic. It included just one originalist majority opinion, Justice
Ginsburg's opinion in Evenwel v. Abbott,"' in which the Court held
that states are permitted to draw legislative districts based on total
population even if it deviates significantly from voting-eligible population (whether because of the presence of military bases or prisons or
owing to large numbers of disenfranchised former convicts, noncitizens, or children).8 2 Justice Ginsburg opened her opinion by invoking
James Madison's and Alexander Hamilton's suggestions in the Federalist Papers and during the Convention debates that political representation attached to individuals rather than to voters. 3 The opinion
homed in on the relatively specific language of Article I, § 2 of the
Constitution, which directs that representation "shall be apportioned
among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers."8 4
Evenwel is continuous with a practice that long predates Justice Scalia's tenure: the use of historical analysis in cases in which the Court
interprets language it understands in specific terms. 5
By contrast, historical analysis was absent entirely in decisions involving the constitutionality of various practices under the kinds of
open-ended constitutional provisions to which Justice Scalia always referred in lamenting the ascendancy of nonoriginalism. Among those
decisions were an unsuccessful equal protection challenge to the University of Texas at Austin's race-based affirmative action policy,8 6 a
successful substantive due process attack on Texas's regulation of
abortion providers, 7 and several cases (one of which featured a majority opinion by Justice Scalia) challenging capital sentencing practices
under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. 8 In none of these cases did
the Court deploy remotely originalist reasoning.
These cases are not outliers. Justice Scalia never succeeded at altering the Court's "evolving standards of decency" inquiry in Eighth
Amendment cases.8 9 To the contrary, during Justice Scalia's tenure
and over his vociferous dissent, the Court used that test, which solicit81

136

82

See id. at
See id. at

83

S. Ct.

1120

(2016).

1126-27.
1127.

84 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1127.
85 See generally Greene, supra note
74.
86 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (FisherII), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
87 Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
88 See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016) (Scalia, J.);
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
89 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, roo-or
(1958) (plurality opinion)).
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ed the Justices' own independent judgment as to whether a particular
punishment was disproportionate, to categorically exclude the intellectually disabled,90 juveniles,9 1 and those convicted of child rape 9 2 from
capital sentences and to prohibit life imprisonment without parole for
juveniles. 9 3 In Fourth Amendment cases defining the substance and
scope of an unconstitutional search or seizure, Justice Scalia sought
unsuccessfully to steer the Court away from the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test 9 4 of Katz v. United States9 5 and toward a categorical inquiry into the kinds of places protected against state intrusion at
common law.9 6 While occasionally humoring Justice Scalia's inquiry
into common law property boundaries, other members of the Court
have consistently signaled their comfort with a nonoriginalist approach
in these cases.97 Originalism has played little or no role in the Court's
affirmative action, 98 sex discrimination,99 abortion rights,10 0 takings,1 0 1
free speech, 1 0 2 or Commerce Clause1 0 3 cases during Justice Scalia's
tenure.
It is fitting that one of Justice Scalia's last substantial opinions was
his fierce dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, 1 0 4 which invalidated state
prohibitions on marriages between same-sex couples.1 0 5 At oral argument in a predecessor case, Hollingsworth v. Perry,10 6 Justice Scalia
had asked Theodore Olson, who argued on behalf of same-sex couples,
to tell him "when [it became] unconstitutional to exclude homosexual

90 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313, 321 (2002).
91 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574-75; see also id. at 590 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008).
93 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
94 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
95 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
96 See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414-15 (2013).
97 See, e.g., id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954-55
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); cf. id. at 957-58 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting Justice Scalia's historical approach to the constitutionality of warrantless use of a GPS tracker
on a car over an extended period of time).
98 See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989).
99 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
100 See Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
101 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992).
102 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011);
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
103 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
104 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626-31 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10

See id. at 2604-05 (majority opinion).

106

133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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couples from marriage."10 Olson answered that it became unconstitutional when "we as a culture determined that sexual orientation is a
characteristic of individuals that they cannot control" and that this determination is the result of "an evolutionary cycle" that has "no specific
date in time."10
That Justice Scalia asked the question reflects the singularly rapid
pace of cultural change that would soon produce Obergefell, which was
handed down twelve years to the day after Lawrence v. Texas' 09 invalidated anti-sodomy laws in thirteen states. 110
Taken together,
Obergefell and Bowers v. Hardwick,' which Lawrence overruled,
provide an apt set of bookends to Justice Scalia's career. Bowers was
decided two weeks after President Reagan announced that he would
be nominating Justice Scalia to the Court. Gay rights were Justice
Scalia's Sarah Connor, and it showed in his violent reaction to their
recognition. 1 1 2 This was an area in which swift social and political
change manifestly affected constitutional doctrine in a way that was
newly inclusive of a previously marginalized group. As section III.B
shows, Justice Scalia owes his fame to his ability to make the case
against precisely this kind of legal change.
That Olson, a former Republican Solicitor General who was arguing his sixtieth case before the Supreme Court,' 1 3 was willing to make
this concession tends by itself to refute any claim that the U.S. constitutional culture is originalist in any way that Justice Scalia would have
recognized. As Justice Kennedy wrote for the Obergefell majority:
History and tradition guide and discipline [the fundamental rights] inquiry
but do not set its outer boundaries. That method respects our history and
learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present.
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own

times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in
all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter
protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.
When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution's central pro-

107 Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144), https://www
.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/I2-I44a.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q77V

-ZUWR].
108 Id. at 40.
109 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
110 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA
1861-2003,

at

297 (2008).

111 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
112 See infra section III.B, pp. 176-83.
113 See Theodore B. Olson: Selected Appellate Litigation, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER
LLP,

http://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyers/Documents/TOlson-CaseList20I6.pdf [https://perma.cc
/F5PH-AW 7 X].
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a claim to liberty must be

addressed.114
Compare this language to the language of Bowers. There, Justice
White wrote in his majority opinion that the Court was not "inclined
to take a more expansive view of [its] authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause" 15 and that the
Court "comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language
or design of the Constitution."11 6 The dissonance between these words
and those of Justice Kennedy in Obergefell reveals any claim that
originalism has flourished during Justice Scalia's tenure on the Court
to be, at best, facetious.'
There are important counterexamples, though these are not without
complexity. Justice Scalia's most significant jurisprudential triumphs
were in the area of criminal procedure. He was a key member of the
coalition of Justices who insisted that every fact predicate to increasing
a defendant's criminal liability or sentence exposure had to be presented to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In Apprendi v.
New Jersey,"" the first of this line of cases, Justice Stevens grounded
the Court's holding in common law restrictions on judicial discretion
and insistence on the reasonable doubt standard.11 9 Apprendi birthed
a series of cases that dramatically altered the role of the jury in criminal sentencing: Ring v. Arizona1 2 0 guaranteed jury findings of any fact
necessary to impose the death penalty; 1 2 1 Blakely v. Washington1 22 (in
which Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion) invalidated a state
sentencing guidelines scheme that relied on judicial findings to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum; 12 3 and United States
v. Booker1 2 4 visited the same fate on the federal guidelines (while rendering those guidelines advisory as a matter of remedy). 12 5 Although

114 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (citations omitted).
115 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
116 Id.; see also id. at Ig6 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (resting on his view that "[d]ecisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the
history of Western civilization").
117 Cf id. at 194 (majority opinion) ("[T]o claim that a right to engage in [sodomy] is 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at
best, facetious.").
118 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

119 See id. at 477-83.
120 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

121 See id. at 589.
122 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
123 See id. at 304-05.
124 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

125 See id. at 226-27, 246.
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not all of these opinions dwelled on historical materials, it is fair to say
that an originalist impulse motivated the entire line of cases. 1 26
The other significant area of criminal procedure in which
originalism seems to have triumphed relates to the Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation. Justice Scalia wrote an originalist majority
opinion in Crawford v. Washington, 1 2 7 which overruled Ohio v.
Roberts1 28 to hold that a criminal defendant must have an opportunity
to cross-examine any testimonial witness, regardless of traditional
hearsay rules. 1 2 9 Crawford was quickly followed by a series of decisions in which the Court took an expansive view of the kinds of evidence and the kinds of witnesses subject to Crawford's rule. 1 3 0
The originalism in the Apprendi and Crawford lines (such as it
is),13 I does not reflect a secular trend. The vote lineup in these cases
provides a ready explanation. The Apprendi majority consisted of Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg: two originalistformalists and three judges on the traditionally liberal side of the
Court. And although Crawford was a 7-2 decision, its more controversial follow-up in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts1 3 2 featured precisely
the same majority as Apprendi.133 A deal between the Court's liberals
and its formalists was the only way to secure a unified majority in
these cases. This kind of overlapping consensus is hardly a harbinger
of a sea change in constitutional interpretation.
The other conspicuous instance of originalism during Justice Scalia's tenure was of course his majority opinion in District of Columbia
v. Heller,1 3 4 which held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a handgun in one's home.1 3 5 The opinion engaged in a lengthy historical analysis of the meaning of the words of
the Amendment, only noting some fifty pages in that there was a
126 See Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 184
(2005).
127 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

128 448 U.S. 56 (g8o).
129 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
130 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (applying Crawford to forensic
analyses); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (holding that Crawford required the
state to produce the actual author of a testimonial forensic report). The Court appeared to pull
back from Crawford in two later cases. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (permitting
expert witness testimony to discuss a state forensic report without producing the report itself);
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015) (permitting admission of certain out-of-court statements
made by a child abuse victim on the grounds that the statements were not testimonial).
131 See Bibas, supra note 126, at 192-97 (providing support for the historical account in
Crawford, but questioning it in Apprendi and Blakely).
132 557 U.S. 305.
133 See id.
134 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
135 See id. at 635.
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longstanding opinion that might need to be overruled. 1 36
Heller's
originalism is indeed remarkable, but at least as remarkable was a single sentence fragment:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications
on the commercial sale of arms.137
There is nothing originalist about this passage. Indeed it resolves
controversial and difficult questions on a series of issues through ipse
dixit. Felons convicted of what?1 3 Mentally ill in what way? Why is
the sixty-eight-square-mile area containing the White House, both
houses of Congress, most federal agencies and foreign embassies, numerous national landmarks, and the Supreme Court building itself not
a "sensitive place"? As much as Heller represents the apex of Justice
Scalia's originalism, it lays bare the limitations of that philosophy
when put into judicial practice. It is reasonable to speculate that
Heller's mysterious ipse dixit was inserted at the request of another
member of Justice Scalia's narrow majority. Compromise is necessary
on a multimember court, but this kind of compromise undermines Justice Scalia's case for originalism, which is grounded in consistency and
predictability
There were other compromises as well, some witting, others perhaps inadvertent. As he noted in his Taft Lecture, Justice Scalia on
occasion softened his originalist commitments in deference to stare
decisis.1 3 9 For example, he followed, but refused to extend, dormant
commerce clause cases that he disagreed with as a matter of original
understanding, 1 4 0 and he refused to sign on to originalist reimaginings
of Commerce Clause doctrine. 1 4 1 He rejected substantive due process
based on his textualism and originalism, but he resisted academic efforts to shift the locus of fundamental rights protection to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, where such rights arguably enjoy greater his136 See id. at 620-21.
137 Id. at 626-27. Justice Scalia also noted that these presumptively lawful regulatory measures
were merely examples, and not an exhaustive list of acceptable measures. Id. at 627 n.26.
138 Cf Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2290-92 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that constitutional avoidance counsels against permitting Congress to ban gun possession by
individuals convicted of misdemeanor assault that is merely reckless rather than knowing or
intentional).
139 See Scalia, supra note 34, at 861.
140 See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330,
348 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
141 Justice Scalia declined to join Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), which urged a narrow reading of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause based on constitutional text, structure, and history. See id. at 584-603
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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torical support. 1 4 2 In McDonald v. City of Chicago,1 4 3 which considered whether the Second Amendment applied to state and local gun
laws, the petitioner's lawyer Alan Gura opened by arguing that the
plain text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause provided the strongest support for his position. 14 4 Justice Scalia interrupted Gura's argument: "Well, I mean, what you argue is the darling of the professoriate,
for sure, but it's also contrary to 140 years of our jurisprudence....
[A]s much as I think [substantive due process is] wrong, ... even I
have acquiesced in it. 11145
In several cases Justice Scalia's dual commitments to general rules
and to originalism were out of harmony. He delivered his Taft Lecture
less than three weeks before the Court heard oral argument in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 14 6 in which it would invalidate the city's
construction set aside for minority-owned businesses. 147 It is not obvious how the words of the Fourteenth Amendment would have been
understood in relation to affirmative action plans of the sort at issue in
Croson. The federal government enacted numerous race-conscious
laws, including laws using explicit racial preferences, during Reconstruction; 14 8 translating the assumed constitutionality of these practices
into an originalist rule for states is a complex exercise. Whatever one
thinks of the historical evidence, an assessment of that evidence is conspicuously absent from Justice Scalia's separate opinions in Croson and
in other cases involving race-conscious governmental decisionmaking.
Instead, he consistently offered his principled but historically unsupported view that the Constitution must be regarded as "color-blind." 14 9
The rule swallowed the method.
Likewise, in one of Justice Scalia's most doctrinally significant
writings, his majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith
(Smith JJ),150 he wrote that rational basis review was the appropriate
142 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 813-50 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in
See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF

part and concurring in the judgment).

RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 181-87 (1998).

143 561 U.S. 742.
144 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, McDonald, 561 U.S. 742 (No. 08-1521), https://www
.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/o8- 152 I.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMK6

-UTFG].
at 7.
146 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
147 See id. at 486.
148 See Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government's Power to Enact Color-ConsciousLaws: An
OriginalistInquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 477, 558-62 (1998).
149 Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("In the eyes of
government, we are just one race here. It is American.").
145 Id.

150 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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standard for a religious plaintiff's challenge to a law or state practice
that is neutral as between religions, generally applicable, and not motivated by religious bias. 15 1 Smith initially came before the Court during the 1987 Term, when the case was remanded for a determination
of whether the religious practice at issue - peyote use - was illegal
under state law, which might be relevant to the constitutionality of the
respondent's termination. 1 5 2 In the two years between Smith I and
Smith II, Justice Scalia delivered his Taft Lecture on the importance
of originalism. There is evidence that the Free Exercise Clause would
have been understood by members of the Founding generation to
compel a hard look at neutral and general laws that have the effect of
substantially burdening religious exercise.1 5 3
As Professor Michael
McConnell notes, and as other legal historians have shown, 1 5 4
Founding-era practices and assumptions do not compel the view that
religious exemptions from generally applicable laws should always be
available.1 5 5 But the contrary view, that a substantial burden on free
exercise of religion is constitutionally irrelevant, is arguably inconsistent with the "theoretical underpinning" of the Free Exercise Clause,
which assumes that "the right of free exercise is defined in the first instance not by the nature and scope of the laws, but by the nature and
scope of religious duty."1 5 6
And yet Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith II is not even a little bit
originalist and does not purport to be. Instead, he grounded the
Court's holding in a creative reading of precedent1 5 7 and in a fear of
the consequences of a balancing test on the outcome of religious
claims: "What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his personal faith?" 1 5
Again, an adherence to general rules and to judicial

See id. at 878-79.
152 Emp't Div. v. Smith (Smith I), 485 U.S. 66o, 673-74 (1988).
153 Cf Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. Ilo6, 1107-lo (1994) (arguing that Smith is
consistent with eighteenth-century views of the Free Exercise Clause but not necessarily with
those prevalent at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, which incorporated the Free Exercise
Clause against the states). See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise ofReligion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
154 See Philip A. Hamburger, A ConstitutionalRight of Religious Exemption: An HistoricalPerspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. gl5 (1992).
155 See McConnell, supra note 153, at 1512.
151

156 Id.
157 See Smith II, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (igg0) (describing instances in which the Free Exercise
Clause has been triggered by "neutral, generally applicable law[s]" as involving "hybrid situation[s]" in which claimants invoked the clause "in conjunction with other constitutional protections").
158 Id. at 887.
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restraint seemed to undermine Justice Scalia's commitment to
originalism.
Perhaps less wittingly, Justice Scalia never faced up to the implications of incorporation of the Bill of Rights for originalist practice.
Original meaning originalism invites an interpreter seeking to apply
the Bill of Rights against the states to train on Reconstruction-era
rather than Founding-era understandings of those rights.1 5 9 Justice
Scalia consistently overlooked or refused to accept that invitation in
cases involving incorporated rights. As many others have done when
considering incorporation, 16 0 his Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, for
example, invariably dissects eighteenth-century common law assumptions even though local constables were not bound by the Fourth
Amendment until at least 1868.161
In sum, Justice Scalia's approach to originalism was, by its own
lights, impure in numerous ways. It was incautious in distinguishing
original meaning from original expected applications. It succumbed to
question-begging exceptions. It interacted uneasily and inconsistently
with stare decisis. It conditioned the invocation of history on whether
that history could support a general rule.
These adulterations lend significant insight into why originalism
has failed to capture the Court. A scholar has the luxury of proposing
a theory without regard for its political economy. A judge is a member
of a political institution. He must constantly safeguard the conditions
of his own legitimacy1 6 2 by respecting past precedents and norms of
decisionmaking. On a multimember court, he must negotiate with
others who may not share his substantive or methodological commitments. For a judge, theories of interpretation cannot and do not exist
apart from theories of adjudication. Interpretation is construction,
and vice versa. In this institutional environment, as both Fallon and
Justice Scalia recognized, originalism is necessarily one piece of a pluralistic approach. Just as it always has been.1 63
B. Rules
As we have seen, Justice Scalia also sought to change the Court
along a different, orthogonal, and sometimes contradictory plane. He
wanted the Court to eschew balancing tests in favor of categorical and
159 See AMAR, supra note 142, at xiii; Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71
MD. L. REV. 978, 983-88 (2012); Lash, supra note 153, at irog.
160 See Greene, supra note 159, at 984.
161 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights constrains
the federal government but not the states).
162 See Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 963 (2008).
163 See BOBBITT, supra note 26, at 24 ("It is easy to see that [certain historical arguments] are
better for dissent than for the Court because . . . they express a particular moral point and are
therefore more effective as rhetoric than as decision procedure.").
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general rules. This commitment at times overwhelmed his commitment to originalism, as his opinions in Smith II and the affirmative action cases seem to show.
A preliminary assessment of the Court's performance along these
lines is not promising for the champion of general rules. Ad hoc balancing and sui generis doctrine appear to be as present in U.S. constitutional law as ever. As above, Heller is instructive. Justice Scalia
was the author of the opinion, and yet the rule that emerged from it is
that gun possession is constitutionally protected except when it is
not. 1 6 4 The tendency of Supreme Court rules to generate self-refuting
exceptions is not limited to Heller. Take the well-known tiers of scrutiny framework, which attempts to categorize laws infringing on certain rights as deserving of particularized forms of scrutiny, whether
"strict," or "intermediate," or, in effect, none. This framework seems
quite plainly to have collapsed, if it ever had teeth in the first place. 165
This past Term, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher
JJ),166 the Supreme Court upheld the race-conscious admissions policy
of the University of Texas while applying a form of strict scrutiny that
appears to be unique to the context of race-based affirmative action. 167
In Obergefell, the Court invalidated the same-sex marriage prohibitions
of 34 states,1 6 8 in part on equal protection grounds, while declining to
make any reference to the tiers of scrutiny.1 6 9 Disability cases appear
to warrant some standard between rational basis review and intermediate scrutiny. 17 0 Children earn special solicitude.' Each particular

164 See infra pp. 161-62.
165 See James E. Fleming, "There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause": An Appreciation of
Justice Stevens's Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2304-1o (2006)
(seeking to deconstruct the view that the tiers of scrutiny framework is rigid rather than pliable).
166 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
167 See id. at 2209 (relying in part on the defendant's "good-faith efforts to comply with the
law"); id. at 2223 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 380 (2003)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Although the Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is unprecedented in its deference.").
168 At the time of the Obergefell decision, eleven states and the District of Columbia had approved of marriages between same-sex unions via legislation or popular referendum, and an additional five had done so by way of a decision of the state's highest court based on an interpretation
of the state constitution. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2615 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
169 See id. at 2602-04 (majority opinion).
170 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985) (invalidating a
zoning regulation for a home for the intellectually disabled while purporting to apply rational basis review).
171 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982) (holding unconstitutional Texas's denial of
free public education to the children of undocumented immigrants while claiming to apply rational basis review).
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fundamental right, whether abortion,172 or voting,
or guns,174 or individual Bill of Rights provisions, bears its own bespoke doctrinal
formula.1 7 5 As Justice Stevens wrote in a dissent from Justice Scalia's
(mostly) "rule"-bound opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council 76 : "Like many bright-line rules, the categorical rule established in this case is only 'categorical' for a page or two in the U.S.
Reports."1 77
Justice Scalia's preference for rule promulgation rested in large part
on the nature of an apex court with a discretionary docket. Common
law-like accretion of the law ill suits such a court, he said, inasmuch
as creating uniformity in federal law is part of the Court's purpose. 178
"To adopt such an approach," he said in his Holmes Lecture, "is effectively to conclude that uniformity is not a particularly important objective with respect to the legal question at issue."1 79 But the pattern
Justice Stevens identified in Lucas tends to recur. Even in cases in
which the Court initially announces a general rule, the rule is soon
or even ab initio - subject to ad hoc exceptions.
In Lucas, Justice Scalia qualified the rule that regulations that deprive land of all economically beneficial use qualify as takings with an
exception for "restrictions that background principles of the State's law
10
of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership."s
As
scholars have observed, the law of nuisance itself requires substantial
balancing, and the common law exception has proven generative for
states and localities seeking to avoid regulatory takings liability.'81
Smith II likewise qualified its rule that neutral laws of general ap-

172 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (fashioning an "undue burden" standard for laws that regulate abortions prior to fetal viability).
173 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789-90 (1983) (articulating a balancing test for
state restrictions on voting rights).
174 See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3 d 426, 440 (3d Cir. 2013) (upholding New Jersey's concealed carry law under intermediate scrutiny); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3 d 865, 882 (4 th Cir. 2013) (upholding Maryland's handgun permitting law under intermediate scrutiny); Kachalsky v. County
of Westchester, 7o F.3 d 81, 97-1or (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding New York's concealed carry law
under intermediate scrutiny).
175 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 870 (2oo6) (empirically demonstrating the
context-sensitive nature of strict scrutiny in federal court cases).
176 505 U.S. 1003 (19g2).
177 Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178 See Scalia, supra note 5o, at 17g;
cf Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 347-48 (1816)

(emphasizing the need for uniform interpretation of federal law as a prudential basis for extending
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over federal decisions by state courts).
179 Scalia, supra note 5o, at i179.

U.S. at 1029.
181 See Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background
Principlesas Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 331-33 (2005).
180 Lucas, 505
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plicability do not offend the Free Exercise Clause with an exception
for what it called "hybrid situation[s]" in which other constitutional
values were implicated. 18 2 For example, the Court's rejection of a licensing scheme that curtailed the pamphleteering of Jehovah's Witnesses intertwined issues of religious freedom with those of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press.18 3 And decisions invalidating various
regimes of compulsory education that harmed religious claimants involved the constitutional right of parents to direct the education of
their children. 18 4 Smith II's "hybrid" exception, necessary to reconcile
the Court's prior case law with the new rule, has baffled lower courts
and commentators.18 5
Or consider Crawford, whose judicial straitjacket was loosened in subsequent cases defining which out-of-court
statements are testimonial. 6 Or R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,"" in
which Justice Scalia established the Byzantine rule that government
regulations must be content neutral even within a category of unprotected speech unless the reason for the content sensitivity tracks the
reason the category of speech is unprotected in the first place. 8 8 The
first significant test of this rule, a case about a statute that banned
cross burning with intent to intimidate, produced a badly splintered
Court. 1 9

Smith II, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
183 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-05 (1940).
184 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-15 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925).
185 See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3 d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) ("We ... can think of no
good reason for the standard of review to vary simply with the number of constitutional rights
that the plaintiff asserts have been violated."); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F 3 d 177, 180 (6th Cir.
1993) (calling "completely illogical" the idea that "the legal standard under the Free Exercise
Clause depends on whether a free-exercise claim is coupled with other constitutional rights"); see
also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1121 (rggo) ("How can claimants be entitled to greater relief under a 'hybrid' claim
than they could attain under either of the components of the hybrid? One suspects that the notion
of 'hybrid' claims was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder in this case.").
186 See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 360 (2011) (adopting a totality of the circumstances
test to determine whether a murder victim's statements to police were testimonial); id. at 378-79
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The majority's analysis which relies on, inter alia,
what the police knew when they arrived at the scene, the specific questions they asked, the particular information [a dying declarant] conveyed, the weapon involved, and [the declarant's] medical condition illustrates the uncertainty that this test creates for law enforcement and the lower
courts.").
187 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
182

188 See id. at 386-88.
189 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). Five justices agreed that the First Amendment
permitted a state to ban cross burning with intent to intimidate, id. at 347, while three Justices
agreed with the (divided) Virginia Supreme Court that the statute impermissibly discriminated
within the category of threatening speech, id. at 380-82 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part); see also Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 742 (Va. 2001)
("The Virginia cross burning statute is analytically indistinguishable from the ordinance found
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Rules have their place. Professor Kathleen Sullivan has written in
these pages that a legal rule "binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts."19 0 This
limitation might be perfectly sensible in developing doctrine under
structural constitutional provisions that must set the ground rules for
constituting and empowering the government in the first instance. It
is at least as important for those ground rules to be clear and predictable as it is for them to achieve any kind of justice. Thus, many scholars regard as Justice Scalia's finest opinion' 91 his solo dissent in Morrison v. Olson,1 9 2 in which he argued that the independent counsel was
not an inferior officer - and therefore had to be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate - because the occupant was not subordinate to any executive officer.1 9 3 The majority
employed a multifactor test to determine the line between inferior and
principal officers. 1 9 4 Less than a decade later, in Edmond v. United
States,19 5 Justice Scalia wrote an opinion for eight Justices that whittled the test down to one factor suspiciously reminiscent of his Morrison dissent: "[w]hether one is an 'inferior' officer depends on whether
he has a superior."196
It is not a coincidence that the rules referenced above that failed to
settle the law involved interpretive challenges quite unlike the definition of an inferior officer. 197 Rights provisions such as the constitutional guarantees of free exercise, confrontation, and free speech are
very much in the business of doing justice; whether or not it is right to
understand them in this way, actual courts will do so, and justice re-

unconstitutional inR.A.V"). Justice Thomas did not believe the First Amendment applied to the
conduct at issue and so did not engage R.A.V See Black, 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
190 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, ip9 Term - Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 1o6 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992).
191 See, e.g., Terry Eastland, Scalia's Finest Opinion, WKLY. STANDARD, Mar. 21, 2016, at l6.
192 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
193 See id. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194 See id. at 671-72 (majority opinion).
195

520 U.S. 651 (1997).
196 Id. at 662.

197 Another example of this dynamic is Brower v. County ofInyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), in which
Justice Scalia sought to establish a bright-line definition of a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment
purposes only to use a different formulation two years later in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621 (1991).
Compare Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97 ("[A] Fourth Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied."), with Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 ("The word 'seizure' readily bears the
meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when
it is ultimately unsuccessful."). Whether a shot suspect who continues to flee has been "seized" is
the subject of a deep circuit split. See Allison K. Wyman, Note, Seized by the Moment - But
Which Moment? How a Physical Force Seizure Requires Only Contact with Intent to Restrain,
Not IntentionalTermination of Movement, 48 Am. CRnvI. L. REV. 1485, 1485-87 (2011).
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quires confronting actual rather than hypothetical or "delimited triggering" facts.
Justice Scalia's final Term at the Court was especially light on
guidance to lower courts. In Fisher II, in addition to applying a relatively deferential form of strict scrutiny,198 the Court entirely ignored a
serious question of Article III standing.19 9 In Whole Woman's Health
v. Hellerstedt 2 0 0 it appeared to discard principles of res judicata that it
applies in other areas.201 It also doubled down on the balancing test of
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 2 0 2 issuing
an intensely fact-bound opinion notwithstanding (or rather, because of)
the moral gravity of the issues involved. 2 0 3 In United States v. Texas, 2 0 4 in which twenty-six states challenged the Obama Administration's program of deferred deportation enforcement and work authorization for certain classes of undocumented immigrants, 2 0 5 the Court
affirmed, 4-4, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit without an opinion. 2 0 6 Declining to give reasons for an affirmance by an equally divided Court is a standard practice, 2 0 7 but in
this case doing so obscured the Court's view of important questions of
state standing and administrative procedure that are quite likely to recur.208 In Zubik v. Burwell,209 the Court declined to decide whether
regulations governing employer exemptions from the requirement to
provide a health insurance plan that included birth control coverage

198 See 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (20I6) (Alito, J., dissenting).
199 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3 d 633, 639-40 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that the
Court chose to remand Fisher on the merits without considering whether the plaintiff had suf-

fered an injury amenable to judicial relief and thus had standing).
200 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
201 The Court invalidated

on its face a Texas requirement that abortion providers have admitting privileges at a local hospital even though the petitioners had brought an unsuccessful facial
challenge in prior litigation. See id. at 2300, 2306; see also id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting)
("[D]etermined to strike down two provisions of a new Texas abortion statute in all of their applications, the Court simply disregards basic rules that apply in all other cases."); id. at 232 1
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Our law is now so riddled with special exceptions for special rights that
our decisions deliver neither predictability nor the promise of a judiciary bound by the rule of
law.").
202 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
203 See Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 ("[T]he Court, when determining the constitutionality of laws regulating abortion procedures, has placed considerable weight upon evidence and argument presented in judicial proceedings.").
204 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
205 See Texas v. United States, 787 F. d 733 (5th Cir.
2015).
3
206 Texas, 136 S. Ct. at 2271.
207 See William L. Reynolds & Gordon G. Young, Equal Divisions in the Supreme Court: History, Problems, and Proposals, 62 N.C. L. REV. 29, 35 (1983).
208 See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court's Silent Failure on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES
(June 25, 20I6), http://www.nytimes.com/20I6/06/26/opinion/sunday/the-supreme-courts-silent-fail
ure-on-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/M46S-NQU2].
209 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
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under the Affordable Care Act violated anyone's federal rights under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 2 1 0 (RFRA). Instead, the Court
in effect ordered a settlement on terms of its own devising between
multiple parties with diverse and apparently irreconcilable interests. 2 1 1
Spokeo v. Robins,2 1 2 which was supposed to resolve the circumstances
under which Congress's provision of a right of action in a federal statute was sufficient to confer Article III standing, did no more than punt
the case back to the Ninth Circuit. 2 1 3
To be sure, some of these piecemeal outcomes, including almost certainly the ones in Texas and in Zubik, resulted directly from Justice
Scalia's unanticipated absence from the bench. In that sense, they are
more poignant than illuminating. But two of the cases mentioned
above that were presumably unaffected by Justice Scalia's death
FisherII and Whole Woman's Health - are the two that best exemplify the reason his preference for rules was unlikely ever to spread to his
colleagues. The softening of strict scrutiny in race-based affirmative
action cases reflects an obvious, though typically sub rosa, recognition
that such policies are not premised on a theory of racial supremacy or
a desire to subordinate any particular group - that indeed affirmative
action is often justified on a remedial theory of equality that is arguably compatible with the Fourteenth Amendment. 214 Rigid scrutiny in
such cases constitutionalizes a status quo of disparate racial access to
elite educational institutions while subjecting the government's interest
in substantive equality to a presumption of unconstitutionality In a
competition between values of formal and substantive equality, strict
scrutiny is a rule-like formulation that awards victory to one side. 2 1 5
Less-strict scrutiny is less rule-like, but in attending to factual context
it provides space for each side to make claims on the outcome, not just
in the present case but in the next one and the one after.
210 See id. at 156o.
211 See id. The Court identified an area of potential agreement between the parties whereunder the religious employers could '"contract for a plan that does not include coverage for some
or all forms of contraception' even if their employees receive cost-free contraception coverage
from the same insurance company." Id. (quoting Supplemental Brief for Petitioners at 4, Zubik,
136 S. Ct. 1557 (No. 14-1418)). The employers insisted, however, that such a plan would need to
involve a separate contracting process for employees - one that the government insisted could
not be reconciled with state law or with the goals of the Affordable Care Act. Compare Supplemental Brief for the Petitioners at i, Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (No. 14-1418), with Supplemental Reply Brief for the Respondents at 1, 3-6, Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (No. 14-1418). Moreover, even if
these positions may be reconciled, there are dozens of other pending cases with different parties
who have made no concessions to the Court but whose cases remain in limbo. See Supplemental
Brief for the Respondents at 20, Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (No. 14-1418).
212

136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).

213 Id.

at 1545.
214 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362-64 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
215 Rational basis review would do the same, but with a different victor.
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In abortion rights cases, those on one side of the political spectrum
hold sacrosanct the life of the fetus. Those on the other side view the
woman's reproductive choice as inviolable.
Under the trimester
framework of Roe v. Wade, the life of the fetus was declared constitutionally insubstantial prior to viability 2 1 6 Prior to Roe, the woman's
reproductive choices were similarly disregarded in states with abortion
prohibitions. Casey, which Whole Woman's Health powerfully reaffirmed, sought to give voice to both sides of the abortion rights debate
by articulating a standard, the undue burden test, that was structurally
incapable of foreclosing outcomes in advance of their particular factual
presentation. 2 1 7 Justice Breyer's clinical attention to the factual findings of the district court in Whole Woman's Health, and indeed his
otherwise cavalier treatment of res judicata, demonstrated a feature,
not a bug, of the post-Casey regime.
Sonia Mittal and Professor Barry Weingast have said that "all successful constitutions lower the stakes of politics." 2 18 In both Fisher II
and Whole Woman's Health, the promulgation of standards rather than
rules was designed to enable a diverse set of political actors, acting
through stable, ultimately conservative institutions, to lay claim to the
law. These cases are emblematic of constitutional law in an era of pluralist democratic politics. As Professor William Eskridge writes, "[a]
pluralist political system is one whose goal is the accommodation of
the interests of as many salient groups as possible, without disturbing
the ability of the state and the community to press forward with collective projects." 2 19 For someone temperamentally predisposed to the
status quo, this tenuous opening of the door to piecemeal contestation
by eclectic individual claimants is, to quote Justice Scalia, "courting
anarchy." 220 For the claimants themselves, having the ear of a court
may be a precondition to democratic membership and a gateway to
political participation.
In many other nations in which apex courts with constitutional jurisdiction engage in judicial review - indeed, exceptions are difficult
to think of - courts explicitly adopt proportionality analysis, a structured approach to balancing. 221 Proportionality comes in different fla216 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
217 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) ("Even when jurists
reason from shared premises, some disagreement is inevitable. That is to be expected in the application of any legal standard which must accommodate life's complexity." (citation omitted)).
218 Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to
Democratic Stability in America's First Century, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 278, 279 (2013).
219 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by
Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1293 (2005).
220 Smith II, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
221 See DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 169-7 l (2004); Vicki C.
Jackson,
ConstitutionalLaw in an Age of Proportionality,124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3096 (2015).
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vors, but its most salient feature relative to American law is that it is
transsubstantive. 2 2 2 A court's determination that it must apply proportionality does not generally depend on its characterizing the right or
the litigant as specially deserving of constitutional protection. It is no
accident that proportionality has developed most rapidly within the
jurisprudence of courts existentially committed to pluralism 2 2 3 : Canada, where multiculturalism is an explicit constitutional commitment; 224
Germany, whose Constitutional Court prizes human dignity and is affirmatively, "militant[ly]" committed to maintaining democratic conditions; 2 2 5 the European regional courts in Strasbourg and Luxembourg, 2 2 6 which also temper their rights jurisprudence through the
device of a margin of appreciation; 2 2 7 and the Israeli Supreme Court,
which frequently adjudicates human rights claims brought by members of an ethnic minority group living under occupation. 2 28
The
global spread of proportionality supports what a cursory glance at last
Term's cases more dimly suggests: efforts to excise qualitative judgment from constitutional judging are unlikely to succeed.
III. JUSTICE SCALIA'S SIGNIFICANCE NOTWITHSTANDING
Recall that Justice Scalia's preference for rules over standards was
grounded in the value of predictability. In discussing this preference
during his Holmes Lecture, he made a curious reference: "Predictability, or as Llewellyn put it, 'reckonability,' is a needful characteristic of

222 Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion?American Rights Review and
the Problem of Balancing, 6o EMORY L.J. 797, 864 (20II) ("[Proportionality analysis], while not a
cure-all for the challenges facing constitutional courts, avoids these pathologies by providing a
relatively systematic, transparent, and trans-substantive analytical procedure for the adjudication
of virtually all rights claims.").
223 See Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking ConstitutionalOrdering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism, 6 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 415, 417 (2008).
224 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 27, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, C ii (U.K.) ("This Charter shall be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of
Canadians.").
225 See DONALD
P KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 285 (3d ed. 2012) (cataloguing
provisions of the Basic Law that actively empower the government to limit the rights of those
who would do harm to the free democratic order).
226 See
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any law worthy of the name." 2 2 9 If Justice Scalia appreciated the irony of this citation - as he must have - he did not betray it. Like
Justice Scalia, Professor Karl Llewellyn was a giant of American law
who died in his sleep on February 13, but the similarities end there.
Justice Scalia was perhaps the most important American formalist
since Dean Langdell. Llewellyn was perhaps the ne plus ultra of
American legal realists. 2 3 0
Llewellyn understood the desire for the law to have a measure of
predictability, but that need led him to radically different conclusions
about the judicial role. He did not believe that "reckonability" was an
essential component of a legal system; for Llewellyn, that is, it was not
a box that one must check before regarding the law as legitimate. To
the contrary, Llewellyn devoted his professional life to elaborating the
view that judicial outcomes in difficult cases are not determined by a
general legal rule but are intensely contextual, fact-bound, and contingent. 2 3 1 The passage on "reckonability" that interested Justice Scalia
appears in The Common Law Tradition, in which, among much else,
Llewellyn discussed the lingering judicial ideology of the "one single
right answer." 2 3 2 Not only did Llewellyn think this attitude unnecessary, he was skeptical that it even improved legal certainty in difficult
cases. In such cases, Llewellyn wrote, "my suspicion is that this approach throws the ultimate decision into materially greater chanciness
than does the tougher inquiry into which of the known permissible
possibilities seems the probable best, and why." 2 3 3
The dichotomy between Llewellyn's attention to facts and Justice
Scalia's attention to rules is a recurring theme across American legal
history. Section III.A reflects on that history by reference to Gilmore's
memorable tripartite taxonomy: the Age of Discovery, the Age of
Faith, and the Age of Anxiety Justice Scalia's appearance on the
scene represents a stage in the life cycle of formalism and
antiformalism that characterizes the American legal tradition. Section
III.B locates Justice Scalia's significance in his representation of the
status quo in a rapidly pluralizing era.

229

Scalia, supra note 50, at 1179 (quoting KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW

TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 17 (196o)).
230 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal

Realism, 87 TEx. L. REV. 73', 736 (2009)
(placing Llewellyn at "the center of legal realism").
231 See generally WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
(2d ed. 2012).
232 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS I8 (Quid

Pro Books 2015) (ig6o) (footnote omitted).
233

Id.
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A. The Life Cycle of Formalism
Gilmore's book divides American law from the Founding to the
1970s into three eras or "ages." During the "Age of Discovery," which
ran roughly to the Civil War, great judges such as Justice Joseph Story
of the Supreme Court and Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court were building out American law from
the raw materials of English common law, a sparse written Constitution, and the special conditions of American federalism. 234 Far from
formalistic, opinions of this era were written in what Llewellyn calls
"our Grand Style," 2 3 5 one that evoked first principles and used precedent creatively based on resort to "situation-reason." 2 3 6
The "Age of Faith" followed the Civil War and ran roughly to the
First World War. It featured a formal style of case reasoning that
Gilmore associates with Dean Langdell and the case method. Gilmore
describes the tenets of that age thus:
The post-Civil War judicial product seems to start from the assumption that the law is a closed, logical system. Judges do not make law: they
merely declare the law which, in some Platonic sense, already exists. The
judicial function has nothing to do with the adaptation of rules of law to
changing conditions, it is restricted to the discovery of what the true rules
of law are and indeed always have been. 2 3 7
Justice Scalia was a formalist in this sense. He believed the law,
including constitutional law, was settled at a point in the past and
must be applied today and ever after in a way that is faithful to that
settlement. The legal outcomes that are correct today are those that
would have been considered correct by the lights of the law-giving
generation. For this style of formalist, the lawgiver could have been a
prior court or set of courts, but what is important is that judges in the
present do not upset the expectations of more legitimate lawgivers of
the past.
For Gilmore, Langdell recalled the earlier formalism of Blackstone,
whose Commentaries on the Laws of England likewise presented swirling legal doctrine as if it were settled and clear. Writes Gilmore: "Using
the tools of eighteenth-century analytical 'philosophy,' Blackstone was
in effect constructing a dike which, it could be hoped, would hold back
the encroaching tide." 238 Like Blackstone, Langdell was not an emblem
of an era of legal simplicity but rather a levee constructed to resist legal
complexity. With the industrial revolution came rapid, irreversible
changes in the structure of civil society and a rise in the ways in which
234 See GILMORE, supra note 1, at 17-36.
235 LLEWELLYN, supra note 232, at 4; see GILMORE, supra note 1, at II.
236 LLEWELLYN, supra note 232,
at 41.
237 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 56.
238

Id. at 5.
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individuals could injure one another, enter into contractual agreements,
and breach those agreements. 2 3 9 Langdell sought to impose order on
this new world by (over)simplifying it into basic laws of torts and contracts that applied across disparate factual presentations. 2 4 0
In Gilmore's telling, the Age of Faith was followed by the Age of
Anxiety, in which scholars such as Llewellyn exploded the myth that
law is or should be treated as a branch of the natural sciences and instead sought to treat it as a branch of the social sciences. 2 4 1 The anxiety this shift produced stemmed from a fear that the law lacked any
normative core: is all permitted? 2 4 2 Legal realism's two stepchildren,
the law and economics and critical legal studies movements, 2 4 3 veered
in this direction. Law and economics made a hero of the Holmesian
bad man and gave rise to the "just so" jurisprudence of Posnerian
pragmatism. 2 4 4 Critical legal studies produced scholars such as Professor Mark Tushnet, who memorably argued that, were he a judge, he
would push whatever "result is, in the circumstances now existing,
likely to advance the cause of socialism." 2 4 5
Scalia the jurist was born into a constitutional order that had failed
to identify any prior point of settlement that biases adjudicative law in
favor of the familiar and permits it to follow its conservative instincts. 2 4 6 Seeking to provide that normative core, he sat at the crest
(or, if one prefers, the trough) of a wave of formalistic thinking about
the constraints on judges. The question is how high the elevation was.
B. Justice Scalia's Affluents
In 2005, Professor Laurence Tribe announced that he would not
complete the long-anticipated second volume of his celebrated treatise,
American ConstitutionalLaw.2 4 7 In an open letter published in Green
Bag, Tribe wrote that constitutional law appeared to be at a crossroads

239 See id. at 39-44.
240 See LANGDELL, supra note 15, at vi-vii; see also GILMORE, supra note 1, at 57 ("During
this period the courts became the apostles of reaction and the guardians of a romanticized, oversimplified past.").
241 See GILMORE, supra note 1, at 78-79.
242 See Philip Bobbitt, The Age of Consent, in GILMORE, supra note 1, at IoO, 102.
243 See id. at 107.
244 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, I0 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897); Robert
Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the
"Bad Man" of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903 (1998); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM,
& DEMOCRACY (2003); see also Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59
IND. L.J. 1 (1983).

245 Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411, 424
(1981).

246 See Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641,

714-16

(1990).
247 Laurence H. Ttibe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 292
(2005).
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in which different factions on the Court no longer shared basic premises of the enterprise in which they were engaged. 2 48 Noting, for example, that then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe v. Wade had not
disagreed that abortion rights were constitutionally protected, 2 4 9 Tribe
lamented that many of the 5-4 splits on the later Court "reflect a much
more fundamental and seemingly irreconcilable division within legal
and popular culture that is not amenable to the treatment that a treatise might hope to give such cases." 2 5 0
Tribe was describing the state of constitutional law and politics in
the Age of Scalia. Fractured. Polarized. Irreducible to any coherent
set of doctrinal rules. Lacking shared normative or even empirical
premises.251 The startling pace of technological change has abetted
this disjuncture. Gone is the age of Cronkite, of shared intermediaries
between the general public and the work of the Court and other public
institutions. 2 5 2 As Professor W. Lance Bennett writes: "[Wlidespread
social fragmentation has produced individuation as the modal social
condition in postindustrial democracies." 2 5 3 In this environment, each
community forms a law unto itself. This does not mean that the law
as enforced by public officials loses its coercive authority, but rather,
more than ever, the official institutions of law compete with other expressions of the law in exile. 2 5 4
Professor Robert Cover understood these alternative normative
communities in terms of the multiplicity of law. 2 5 5 African Americans
and other racial or ethnic minority groups see a world in which the
law rejects the Washington v. Davis 2 5 6 paradigm and recognizes dis248

Id.

Id. at 296.
Id. at 302.
251 See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 20IO Term - Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problemsfor ConstitutionalLaw, 125 HARV. L. REV. I (2011).
252 See Yochai Benkler, Lecture, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a PoliticalEconomy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1263 (2003) ("The possibility of sustainable, widely accessible and
effective communications by individuals or groups, organized on- or offline, makes possible direct
democratic discourse. It creates direct means for the acquisition of information and opinion.").
253 W. Lance Bennett, The Personalization of Politics: PoliticalIdentity, Social Media, and
Changing Patterns of Participation,644 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 20, 22 (2012).
254 See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, REGULATION, Winter 1995, at 83,
84 (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)) ("[T]he nondelegation doctrine has existed only as part of the Constitution-in-exile, along with the doctrines of enumerated powers, unconstitutional conditions, and substantive due process, and their textual cousins, the Necessary
and Proper, Contracts, Takings, and Commerce Clauses."); Stephen E. Sachs, The "Constitution
in Exile" as a Problem for Legal Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2253, 2254-55 (2014) (observing that the construct of a Constitution in exile is not limited to conservative thought).
255 See Cover, supra note 17, at 16 ("It is the problem of the multiplicity of meaning - the fact
that never only one but always many worlds are created by the too fertile forces of jurisgenesis
that leads at once to the imperial virtues and the imperial mode of world maintenance.").
256 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
249
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parate impact liability,25 7 embraces race-based affirmative action, 258
and has the capacity to respond effectively to racial profiling or excessive force by the police. 259 Social democrats and progressives see a
world in which universal health care and campaign finance reform infringe no rights. 260 Libertarians see a world in which the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is revitalized to more vigorously protect contract
and property rights. 26 1 And many traditionalists see a world in which
vulnerable, politically conservative understandings of constitutional
law are no longer endangered. They, too, yearn for an advocate.
Gilmore writes:
It may be that every legal system, at some point in its development, goes
through its Age of Faith. Sooner or later a Blackstone or a Langdell appears. The idea of a body of law, fixed for all time and invested with an
almost supernatural authority, is irresistibly attractive - not only for lawyers and their clients but, perhaps even more, for the populace at large. If
a Blackstone or a Langdell comes at the right time, he will be heard and
his words will, for a generation, be devoutly believed: his message is a
comforting one and ought to be true even if it is not. 262

Justice Scalia was the successor within this tradition. The difference is that for Justice Scalia, the great social upheaval that produced
his approach was the demand for equality itself. Justice Scalia was
fond of saying that he preferred a dead Constitution to a living one,
that we should not be so smug as to believe that society was evolving
to a better place rather than a worse one. 2 6 3
It is easy to see how advocacy of this sort can look like bigotry.
This is not the familiar postmodern critique of impartiality as erasing
communities defined by difference, as "attained only by abstracting
from the particularities of situation, feeling, affiliation, and point of

257 See id. at 239.
258 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651-53 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
259 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314-15 (1987) (rejecting the relevance of empirical
evidence showing racial bias in capital sentencing in part because the defendant's claim, "taken to
its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal
justice system"); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (denying a chokehold victim's
standing to seek to enjoin the illegal use of chokeholds by the Los Angeles Police Department).
260 See Democratic Platform Comm., 2016 Democratic Party Platform, 2016 DEMOCRATIC
NAT'L CONVENTION 25, 34 (July 21, 20I6), https://www.demconvention.com/wp-content
/uploads/20I6/o7/Democratic-Party-Platform-7.2i.i6-no-lines.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF6L-TRYC].
261 See BARNETT, supra note 39, at 6o-6I, 356-57; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL
LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 528-29 (2014).
262 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 5 7-58.
263 See Scalia, supra note 63, at 40-41 ("A society that adopts a bill of rights is skeptical that
,evolving standards of decency' always 'mark progress,' and that societies always 'mature,' as
opposed to rot."); see also GILMORE, supra note 1, at 93 (tying newfound interest in legal history
to skepticism about the inevitability of progress).
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view." 2 6 4 The accusation that Justice Scalia's many admirers must
confront is sharper than that. The bill of particulars might begin with
Smith II, in which, recall, Justice Scalia transformed free exercise doctrine by refusing to permit what were, in effect, disparate impact
claims by religious outsiders. The ground for decision in Smith II was
quite directly a fear that religious minorities might cannibalize the law:
The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind - ranging from compulsory military service, to the payment
of taxes, to health and safety regulation such as manslaughter and child
neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, and traffic laws; to
social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, child labor laws,
animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws providing
for equality of opportunity for the races. 2 6 5
On its face, and standing alone, this concern sits comfortably within a Progressive, communitarian tradition. 266 Still, the Smith doctrine
can be criticized from the perspective of representation reinforcement, 267 as it leaves religious minorities at the mercy of a democratic
process that more popular or politically connected religious groups
may successfully navigate.2 68 Christians obtain Sunday closing laws,
which disadvantage religious business owners who observe a Saturday
Sabbath and are barred from recouping their losses the next day.2 6 9 As
Justice Blackmun observed in his Smith II dissent, the federal government exempted the use of sacramental wine from its ban on alcohol
possession during Prohibition. 270
One can explain Smith II, then, either as demonstrating a commitment to a neutral public sphere or, more cynically, as showing simple callousness to the claims of unfamiliar or culturally marginalized
group members. Justice Scalia provided some ammunition for the latter view a decade after Smith II, when he joined Chief Justice

264 IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE

97 (Iggo).

265 494 U.S. 872, 888-89 (iggo) (citations omitted).
266 See Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, go CORNELL
L. REV. 9, 2 1 (2004) (describing communitarianism's general focus on democracy, civic virtue, and
duties as opposed to individual rights).
267 Cf JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
87-88 (1980) (advocating for "participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing" judicial review,
id. at 87).
268 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
ConstitutionalBasis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1288-89 (1994)
(wondering whether, had the group requesting a religious exemption in Smith II been secular or a
mainstream religion, the State would have granted the exception).
269 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (plurality opinion).
270 See 494 U.S. at 913 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing National Prohibition Act, Pub. L.
No. 66-66, § 3, 41 Stat. 305, 308-09 (igig) (repealed 1935)).
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Rehnquist's opinion in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.27 1 There, the
Boy Scouts sought to dismiss a gay assistant scoutmaster in violation
of the neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law of
the state of New Jersey. 27 2 The Court accepted the Boy Scouts' claim
that its freedom of expressive association granted it a constitutional
exemption from the state's antidiscrimination laws. 27 3 It is difficult to
understand Dale's relationship to Smith II: either free association
claims are worthy of greater protection than free exercise claims, or
conservative organizations that injure people out of opposition to homosexuality are worthy of greater protection than members of the
Native American church who believe smoking peyote has spiritual
significance. 27 4
An additional data point came fourteen years later. In Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 27 5 the Court determined that RFRA required the Department of Health and Human Services to provide an
accommodation to religious employers who objected to the requirement, under the Affordable Care Act, that they provide employees
with an insurance plan that includes contraception coverage. 27 6 JUStice Scalia joined the majority opinion without comment. 27 7 Hobby
Lobby is not a constitutional decision, and Smith II itself was the motivation for RFRA's heightened standard for religious claims. 27 8 Still,
Hobby Lobby arguably courts the same "anarchy" as Smith II,279 and
RFRA was intended to embody the pre-Smith II constitutional law
that Justice Scalia claimed in Smith II not to be altering. 28 0 The most
significant difference between Smith II and Hobby Lobby on the facts
is that Smith II involved the claims of members of a socially excluded
religious minority group and Hobby Lobby involved the claims of a
Christian bookseller.
No data point alone is sufficient to establish inconsistency, a resultoriented approach, or a chronic insensitivity to cultural outgroups.
But the puzzling progression from Smith II to Dale to Hobby Lobby
provides some context for numerous accusations of dog whistling that
have trailed Justice Scalia for years. Dissenting in United States v.
271 530 U.S. 640 (2000).

272 Id. at 644.
273 Id.
274 See Stephen Clark, Judicially Straight? Boy Scouts v. Dale and the Missing Scalia Dissent,
76 S. CAL. L. REV. 521 (2003) (proposing and ultimately rejecting various theories on which Dale
and Smith II might be reconciled).
275 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
276 See id. at 2759.
277 See id. at 2758.
278 See id. at 2761.
279 See id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referring to the "startling breadth" of the decision
and "the havoc the Court's judgment can introduce").
280 See Smith II, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
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Virginia,28 1 in which the Court opened the Virginia Military Institute
(VMI) to women, 28 2 he lamented the Court's "criticism of our ancestors," 2 8 3 said that "the function of this Court is to preserve our society's
values . . . , not to revise them," 28 4 and praised VMI's commitment to
"manly honor." 28 5 Dissenting in Romer v. Evans,28 6 in which the Court
blocked Colorado from constitutionally excluding gays and lesbians
from antidiscrimination law, 28 7 Justice Scalia defended the state by referring to Coloradans' "exposure to homosexuals' quest for social endorsement." 28 8 Dissenting in Lawrence v. Texas, 28 9 Justice Scalia accused the Court of "sign[ing] on to the so-called homosexual agenda,"
which he attributed to "some homosexual activists." 290 He reminded
the Court that "[m]any Americans do not want persons who openly
engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as
boarders in their home" 2 9 1 because these people "view this as protecting themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to
be immoral and destructive." 2 9 2 He chided the Court for labeling
these attitudes "discrimination." 2 9 3 In none of these cases did he dissent "respectfully," per the Court's usual civility norms. 2 9 4
Justice Scalia has courted even more controversy along these lines
at oral argument. During the oral argument in Lawrence, he casually
and evocatively compared the right of gays to sexual autonomy to a
right to "flagpole sitting." 2 9 5 During the argument in Shelby County v.
Holder 2 9 6 Justice Scalia attributed Congress's overwhelming 2oo6
vote to reauthorize the Voting Rights Act to "perpetuation of racial entitlement." 2 97 At the oral argument in Fisher II, Justice Scalia raised

281 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
282 See id. at 519.
283 Id. at 567 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
284 Id. at 568.
285 Id. at 60I (internal quotation marks omitted).
286 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
287 See id. at 623-24.
288 Id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
289 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
290 Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
291

Id.

292

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.

293

294 See Note, From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the "Respectful" Dissent, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1305 (20II).

295 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), https://www
.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/02-102.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQ84

-NXGT].
296

133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).

297 Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96), https://www
.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument transcripts/12-96.pdf[https://perma.cc/2Y3J-6Q2N].
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the claim that African American students should perhaps attend a
"less-advanced" or "slower-track" school where classes will not be "too
fast for them." 2 98
We have dwelled in these fields not to malign the dead but to confront the pain that lies visibly beneath the surface of Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence.
The perception of bias against religious minorities,
against women, against gays and lesbians, and against African Americans has a basis beyond the subjective construction Justice Scalia's detractors choose to put upon his jurisprudence. 2 99 The problem with
originalism, just like its promise, has always been rhetorical, a form of
what Professor Meir Dan-Cohen has in a different context called "selective transmission," which he defines as "the transmission of different
normative messages to officials and to the general public."3 0 0 Justice
Scalia could be fainthearted as an adjudicator (as all originalists who
reach the bench must be) so long as he was effectively lionhearted in
his public appraisals of originalism. The irreducible minimum of his
rhetorical commitment was to speak of the constitutional past as something worth returning to.
But those who are seeking to establish their democratic citizenship
through constitutional litigation do not view the past in this restorative
and unabashedly jurispathic register. 3 0 1 For them, instead, it is of nearly existential importance for the Constitution to appear to be open to
novel forms of contestation. It is the very ascendancy of these nomic
communities, the very promiscuity of the law they seek to nurture, that
produces the jurispathic impulse for which Justice Scalia so ably
speaks. 3 0 2 They are not seeking recompense for past wrongs. They are
seeking to establish a new social contract, a new constitutional
grundnorm of mutual recognition rather than of mere tolerance.3 0 3
Originalism and adjudication by general rules ill suit a paradigm of
mutual recognition, with its full-throated embrace of the novel and the
particularized. That incompatibility precisely underwrote Justice Scalia's commitment to his agenda, and it explains why he was destined to
298 Transcript of Oral Argument at 67, FisherII, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981), https://www.sup
remecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/14-98lp8kO.pdf [https://perma.cc

/5VY9-2YLY].
299 Cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) ("We consider the underlying fallacy of the
plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.").
300 Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 635 (1984).
301 See Jamal Greene, Originalism'sRace Problem, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 517, 521-22 (2011).
302 See Cover, supra note 17, at 67-68.
303 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 747-48 (2011) (iden-

tifying the "pluralism anxiety" that besets many Americans who "view civil rights as an endless
parade of groups clamoring for state and social solicitude").
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fail. Gilmore predicted that fate. Toward the end of The Ages of
American Law, he forecast a "new Langdell" who will "return[] to the
elaboration of unitary theories," 3 0 4 a revelation to arrest the revolution.3 0 5 He continued, however, by offering that this person's future
was unlikely to "include[] a triumph as complete as that of
Langdellianism a century ago" because "[iun the polarized society
which we seem to have arrived at, consensus is an unlikely issue."3 0 6
The polarization of which Gilmore spoke is intertwined with the very
fecundity of law, the very constitutional life, that produced Justice
Scalia. By the time he arrived, it was too late for him to succeed. The
new constitutional imaginary is here, it's queer, get used to it.
CONCLUSION

One of the ironies of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence is its incompatibility with Founding-era assumptions about judges. An oft-repeated
anecdote nicely captures the point. At oral argument in a little-known
30
case called Barnard v. Thorstenno
a constitutional challenge to the
bar admission rules for the Virgin Islands, Justice O'Connor admonished the lawyer for the petitioner for addressing her and the other
30
members of the Court as "Judge."o
Later in the argument, after the
lawyer repeated the error and quickly corrected herself, Justice Stevens
retorted, "your mistake in calling me Judge is also made in Article III
of the Constitution."3 0 9 For all the majesty of Cass Gilbert's marble
palace at One First Street, and for all their self-awareness as what
Blackstone called "depositaries of the laws; the living oracles, who
must decide in all cases of doubt,"3 1 0 Supreme Court Justices, no less
than their "inferior" colleagues, were intended to exercise their judgment on a case-by-case basis.3 11
Justice Scalia did not much move the Court doctrinally or methodologically in constitutional law. He no doubt sharpened his colleagues,
who suddenly had to defend their pluralism or their purposivism. He
seems, at least in his day, to have made the bench quite a bit hotter at
304 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 96.
305 Gilmore died in May 1982. See Memorialfor Grant Gilmore, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,
1982,

at D26. President Reagan nominated Justice Scalia to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit two months later. See Nominations Submitted to the Senate, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
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306 GILMORE, supra note 1, at g.
307 489 U.S. 546 (1989).

Oral Argument at 6:45, Barnard, 489 U.S. 546 (No. 87-1939), http://www.oyez.org/cases
/1988/87-1939 [https://perma.cc/23Q9-TCT4].
30s

309 Id. at 12:29.
310 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.

311 Congress did not give the Court general federal question jurisdiction until 1875. See Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012)).
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oral argument. 3 12 Outside of constitutional law, he might well have
changed the interpretive center of gravity from legislative intent to
statutory text.3 13 He certainly got the attention of the professoriate.
But his greatest success within constitutional law was in satisfying
what in other legal contexts has been called a process value. 3 1 4 By
lending his affable tenor, more melodious still on the printed page, to
conservatives anxious about social change, he represented their interests in the ongoing process of constitutional construction, 3 1 5 the very
process he fought to the death.
He lost. The rule of law is inevitably the rule of men, 3 16 and both
men and rules are mortal. "All Ages of Faith may well be of brief duration," Gilmore concluded.3 17 "The pleasant and comforting myth of
the law's internal consistency and external stability cannot, for long,
sustain itself. The facts of life cannot, for long, be suppressed." 18
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